ICT4Peace 2022 End of Year Reflections
The war in Ukraine was the paramount event of the past year. It defined international relations and will dominate annual reviews as well. It foreshadows profound changes in the international security architecture. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine is far less a game changer than an eye opener. Much what became obvious in 2022 was well there before.
The principles and modalities agreed upon among states thirty years ago – on the “end of history” – are more radically called into question than ever before. This concerns the obligation under international law not to resort to force and to recognize borders and sovereignty. But it concerns as well basic values such as the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and market economy. On closer examination, the erosion of those once agreed commonalities already happened since the turn of the millennium.
The illusion that economic interdependence makes conflicts and wars unattractive and eventually impossible has faded. The dependence on Russian gas and oil has made the international community, on the contrary, vulnerable to blackmail. And the risks of dependence on Chinese industrial production have become appallingly obvious, already since the Covid pandemic.
The weak military capabilities of Western European states have become undeniable, as has the important role of the United States for the security in Europe – not only due to its military capability, but also to form coalitions and to assume a leadership role.
Surprising to many – certainly to Russia itself – was the poor performance of the Russian armed forces, the deficiencies in doctrine, equipment, training, and ability to conduct joint operations. Equally surprising to many was the strong resistance and dynamism of the Ukrainian defense. The motivation to stand up for the country and the military buildup of recent years have had an impressive impact.
Less surprising was the weak role of multilateral organizations in crisis management (UN, OSCE). Both organizations were created in very different political contexts, building from the experiences of World War II and Cold War. It is wrong to blame these institutions for their inadequate role. First and foremost, to criticize are the states that have created these organizations to solve problems together and have not used them.
An exciting and open question is whether and how the experience from the Ukraine war will lead to new security structures in Europe and beyond. Sweden’s and Finland’s application to join NATO are significant signs in that regard. The key question is whether it will be a security architecture with, without, or against Russia.
Tensions between great powers have been deeper during the past year than they have been for a long time. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the return of great power rivalry was a major theme in international debates. However, what we see is not a return to an earlier phase in history, a renewed cold war. It is not the shadows of the past but the harbingers of a future that will be quite different from the bipolar world order of the cold war years.
It is too often ignored how differently the war in Ukraine is perceived outside the Western world. Countries in the global South do condemn Russia’s violation of international law. But few take sides. The main impacts of the Ukraine war are food insecurity and rising energy prices with significant social and political impact. This often adds to an environment of poverty, economic stagnation, demographic challenges, and climate change.
No cyber Pearl Harbor, but the first war in which cyber warfare plays a dominant role.
Most security policy experts had expected that a war in Ukraine would start with massive cyberattacks. That was obviously not the case, or at least not very visible. The missing cyber Pearl Harbor is one of the reasons why the Russian military attack on February 24th has surprised many. The lack of massive cyberattacks is still an enigma today. Russia has a lot of offensive cyber capabilities, and Ukraine was already a testing ground for Russian cyberattacks years before. Did Russia expect a quick occupation of Ukraine and wanted to take over the country without much destruction? Did cyber operations fail as almost all other aspects of Russian warfare? Were the defensive measures taken by Ukraine and its supporters particularly effective and prevented major damage? Insightful studies are available now, but a shared conclusion is lacking.
There is no doubt: Cyberwarfare is not a side show of the war in Ukraine. Information and communication technologies have created conditions that are strikingly different from previous conflicts of the post-Cold War era. The Ukraine war is the first war in which cyber warfare has played a dominant role, starting from political propaganda, and influencing up to the reality on the battlefield.
The information operations of both warring parties were – and still are – massive. With it, Ukraine and its supporters have primarily won over the public in the West for their side. Russia conducted information operations in Western countries as well. But more important was shielding its own population and protecting the Kremlin’s narrative on the war. Important and impactful was Russia’s communication in the global South.
Throughout the war there were physical and digital attacks on fixed facitities to disrupt ICT infrastructure. But the main cyber battlefield was elsewhere. The defense against military attacks prompted digital operations and capacities across borders. The cloud became rapidly part of the defense efforts and a battlefield as well.
The military played its role in the cyber warfare, but also private actors, companies, security firms, and groups of hackers. These are all parts of the new battlefield. And it raises complicated questions under international law.
Only much later, in retrospect, will we gain a better picture of cyber operations in the war in Ukraine. However, a foreshadowing of how future conflicts will play is more visible now than it was a year ago.
The war in Ukraine and the significant role of cyber operations have added relevance to the work of ICT4Peace.
As an independent foundation ICT4Peace promotes international and human security in cyberspace. Its ongoing activities fit perfectly to the current challenges and changes wrought by the war in Ukraine and the increasingly pervasive use of information communications technologies (ICTs)
Much of ICT4Peace’s work in 2022 was devoted to contributing to multilateral discussions at the UN and elsewhere. With discussions at the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the use of ICTs (OEWG) continuing, albeit amidst considerable tensions, ICT4Peace contributed several policy submissions, participating in online informal sessions in March 2022 and December 2022, as well as in–person at the July 2022 OEWG meeting in New York. However, the UN OEWG meetings were not the only important multilateral discussions taking place on ICTs. In October 2022, the Organization of American States (OAS) held a meeting of its Working Group on Cyber Confidence Building Measures where ICT4Peace provided a civil society perspective on how regional organizations can contribute to responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. ICT4Peace also contributed to Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) meetings on updating its Code of Conduct of Political-Military Aspects of Security, highlighting the important emerging challenges posed to human rights by private military and security companies using ICTs in their services.
As a companion to these public submissions and presentations, ICT4Peace carried out more substantive work in the form of numerous articles, think pieces and policy papers. Of note, ICT4Peace published the groundbreaking mapping study on the use of ICTs in Security Services provided by Private Commercial Actors. Developed under a grant provided by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, Peace and Human Rights Division, the mapping study sheds light on how ICTs are being used in the provision of private security services, related human rights concerns as well as articulated some ways forward to respond to these concerns. ICT4Peace also supported Dr. Sanjana Hattotuwa’s work at Te Pūnaha Matatini’s Disinformation Project, looking at the emergence, entrenchment and expansion of the infodemic and long-term consequences for New Zealand, including the rise of violent misogyny online and its impacts on women’s willingness to participate in public life. In addition, ICT4Peace published numerous articles including on mis/disinformation, global digital surveillance, the invasion of Ukraine, cyber arms control and disarmament and cybersecurity discussions at the UN, among others.
ICT4Peace also joined forces with other organisations, engaging in partnerships that produced innovative results. Working with Fondation Hirondelle and Principles for Peace, ICT4Peace contributed to a thought piece on “The Digital Space and Peace Processes” that it presented at the 2022 Geneva Peace Week. At the 2022 Paris Peace Forum, ICT4Peace moderated a highlevel panel on the Non–Proliferation of Malicious Software and Practices Intended to Cause Harms. ICT4Peace also continued its partnership with Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, collaborating on a research project supported by the Swiss FDFA Department of International Law on Gendering Cybersecurity through Woman Peace and Security (WPS), which looked at the inclusion of gender issues in national cybersecurity strategies, as well as the consideration of cybersecurity in WPS National Action Plans. In addition, ICT4Peace continued its work with many other partners, including the Cyber Mediation Network, the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, The Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator, Digital Peace Now, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the International Code of Conduct Association for Private Security Service Providers, and established new partnerships, such as with the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, and the Geneva Global Trust Initiative.
2022 could be called ICT4Peace’s year of the podcast, with ICT4Peace’s launch of the Brown Bag Podcast series, supported by the Daniel Gablinger Foundation. In this series, IC4Peace Foundation Special Advisor Dr. Sanjana Hattotuwa interviewed thought leaders from the Global South on matters of social media, politics and society. ICT4Peace representatives were also interviewed on other podcasts, including those of the Asia Society Policy Institute, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and Fondation Hirondelle.
Finally, 2022 was a banner year for the ICT4Peace Academy, which continued and enlarged its partnership with the OAS in delivering courses on “Cyberdiplomacy, Law and Norms”, as well as launching a new series of Masterclasses, the first of which on Cyber Confidence Building Measures was delivered in November 2022. ICT4Peace Academy also delivered new courses on Mis/Disinformation, Cybercrime, Multistakeholder Involvement in Cyber-governance, Artificial Intelligence and Ethics, and Gender and ICTs, and broadened its course participants to include humanitarian organizations and new governments.
Looking ahead to 2023, as ICT4Peace approaches its 20th anniversary, there are several important projects in the works. These include a follow-up to the Mapping Study on the use of ICTs in Security Services provided by Private Commercial Actors, additional course offerings of the ICT4Peace Academy exciting new partnerships and projects – announcements coming soon! Finally, building on and continuing ICT4Peace’s excellent track record, ICT4Peace is excited to announce that in 2023 Anne–Marie Buzatu will take over the role of Executive Director.
We enter 2023 within the context of considerable challenges, including continued conflict, challenging multilateral discussions, social media fragmentation as well as astounding technological developments such as those in artificial intelligence. Against this complex backdrop, ICT4Peace remains committed to working towards realizing the enormous positive potentials of ICTs to bridge social, political and economic divides, to help solve existential challenges and to empower our societies’ work towards the common good.
Anne-Marie Buzatu, Martin Dahinden and Daniel Stauffacher
Geneva, December 2022