How can Arms Control and Disarmament Contribute to a Secure Cyberspace ?

ICT4Peace is proud to publish the Policy Brief by Martin Dahinden, Vice-Chair, ICT4Peace Foundation:

How can Arms Control and Disarmament Contribute to a Secure Cyberspace ?

The publication can be found here.

“Abstract

The arms race in cyberspace poses risks to international stability and security.
Arms control and disarmament have thus far played almost no role in international
discussions on cybersecurity, even though arms control has been importance to
global stability for more than half a century.

This article shows that experience from arms control is relevant to the cyber domain, both for understanding the policy process and as a source of inspiration for concrete solutions. Like cybertechnology,
nuclear technology was once entirely novel and difficult to assess. Comprehensive
agreements were initially unattainable; in contrast, limited and pragmatic steps
led over time to a comprehensive arms control regime.

This approach is also promising for the cyber domain. The concrete experiences and solutions from
arms control cannot simply be transferred to the cyber domain, but they do draw
attention to promising approaches in areas such as no-first-use policy, de-targeting,
non-proliferation, confidence building, prohibition to develop certain dangerous
technologies, cooperation, regional arrangements, verification, enforcement, and
sanctions.

Progress will depend primarily on whether key political actors (US, China,
Russia) can agree on common objectives. This in no way implies that other states,
multilateral organizations, think tanks, academia, and civil society organizations have
no role. What is needed is broad discussion and political pressure, but also innovative
approaches to solutions.”

Paul Meyer, former Ambassador of Canada for Disarmament and Senior Advisor, ICT4Peace Foundation wrote the following comments:

Congratulations on issuing this publication. It is good to remind all concerned that cooperative security arrangements are possible in cyberspace and that more attention should be paid to the experience of arms control and disarmament over the decades.

Offensive cyber operations have special characteristics that do pose challenges for arms control (e.g. the mingling of intelligence and military operations). These are however not beyond the ability of state actors to devise practical solutions to them. The potential of confidence-building measures is particularly apt for initial arrangements.  As Martin rightly notes however, arms control approaches do require a readiness on the part of the states involved to accept a degree of constraint on their own offensive operations. This in turn requires recognition of a mutual security interest in accepting constraints.

Perhaps the detrimental impact of unrestricted offensive cyber operations have now reached a level that will motivate states to do something about it.

Martin Dahinden is Vice-Chairman of the Think Tank ICT4Peace. He was Swiss Ambassador to the USA and teaches security policy at the University of Zurich. He thanks Daniel Stauffacher, Founder and President of ICT4Peace for his inputs and critical review.